Biosecur Bioterror by Vaughan, Elaine et al.
Predicting Response to Reassurances and Uncertainties in 
Bioterrorism Communications for Urban Populations in New 
York and California
Elaine Vaughan, PhD [Research Professor],
Department of Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California, Irvine
Tim L. Tinker, DrPH [Program Lead],
Risk and Crisis Communication Capability, Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., Rockville, Maryland
Benedict I. Truman, MD [Associate Director for Science],
National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention
Paul Edelson, MD [Medical Officer], and
Division of Global Migration and Quarantine; both at the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
Stephen S. Morse, PhD [Professor of Clinical Epidemiology]
Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, NY, and Visiting Professor, 
School of Veterinary Medicine, University of California, Davis
Abstract
Recent national plans for recovery from bioterrorism acts perpetrated in densely populated urban 
areas acknowledge the formidable technical and social challenges of consequence management. 
Effective risk and crisis communication is one priority to strengthen the U.S.’s response and 
resilience. However, several notable risk events since September 11, 2001, have revealed 
vulnerabilities in risk/crisis communication strategies and infrastructure of agencies responsible 
for protecting civilian populations. During recovery from a significant biocontamination event, 2 
goals are essential: (1) effective communication of changing risk circumstances and uncertainties 
related to cleanup, restoration, and reoccupancy; and (2) adequate responsiveness to emerging 
information needs and priorities of diverse populations in high-threat, vulnerable locations. This 
telephone survey study explored predictors of public reactions to uncertainty communications and 
reassurances from leaders related to the remediation stage of an urban-based bioterrorism incident. 
African American and Hispanic adults (N = 320) were randomly sampled from 2 ethnically and 
socioeconomically diverse geographic areas in New York and California assessed as high threat, 
high vulnerability for terrorism and other public health emergencies. Results suggest that 
considerable heterogeneity exists in risk perspectives and information needs within certain 
sociodemographic groups; that success of risk/crisis communication during recovery is likely to be 
uneven; that common assumptions about public responsiveness to particular risk communications 
need further consideration; and that communication effectiveness depends partly on preexisting 
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values and risk perceptions and prior trust in leaders. Needed improvements in communication 
strategies are possible with recognition of where individuals start as a reference point for 
reasoning about risk information, and comprehension of how this influences subsequent 
interpretation of agencies’ actions and communications.
Recent assessments of the bioterrorism threat anticipate that a significant incident could 
occur in the near future.1-3 Since 2001, considerable resources have been devoted to 
improving preparedness, response, rapid recovery, and resilience with the goal of 
minimizing the societal impact and damage should a biological attack occur.2,4,5 Effective 
risk and crisis communication during an incident is a core component of strategic planning 
and is a priority to strengthen the U.S.’s capacity to mitigate consequences.6-9 Yet, since 
September 11, 2001, several extreme risk events in the U.S. and in other countries have 
demonstrated an urgent need to update and improve the risk/crisis communication 
infrastructure and strategies of government agencies and organizations responsible for the 
safety and security of civilian populations.9-12 Terrorist attacks on the London, Mumbai, and 
Madrid public transportation systems; Hurricane Katrina; the December 2008 multisite 
terrorist attacks on “soft targets” in Mumbai, India, over a 60-hour period; the anthrax 
attacks of 2001; and the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 2009-10 all revealed weaknesses in 
crisis, risk, and public health communication planning and operations.
Despite some notable successes, gaps between communication needs of affected populations 
and actual practice included: less than optimal, timely adaptation to unforeseen 
circumstances;9,11-15 difficulties in interagency response coordination and 
cooperation;9,12-16 inadequate or delayed acknowledgment and correction of errors that had 
appeared in previous public communications about the event;13,17-20 inadequate uncertainty 
communication;11,13,16,18 limitations in predicting, assessing, and responding to changing or 
ongoing critical information needs of affected populations;11-13,18,19,21 and less than desired 
effectiveness in risk/crisis communications for certain socially vulnerable and ethnically 
diverse groups.11,17,21-24 Some gaps were historic and reflected longstanding deficiencies, 
such as limited communications about risk uncertainties and significant social disparities in 
the success of risk management strategies, with less desirable outcomes for those most 
vulnerable to adverse consequences of a public health emergency.11,25-28 Other risk/crisis 
communication missteps resulted from the changing characteristics of modern risks and 
limited intelligence about planned attacks, leading to uncertainty about the scope and 
methods of future extreme risk incidents.2,4,6,10,13,15,19,29
Despite significant recent improvements in strategic communication approaches,2,18,30 
ongoing critical vulnerabilities in ways of thinking about and preparing for risk/ crisis 
communication call for increased responsiveness to changing risk scenarios, evolving 
communication goals, and growing scientific evidence about the dynamics of public risk 
perceptions and behaviors during unfolding extreme risk occurrences.31 Even more critical 
is communication preparedness for extreme acts like biological terrorism or other weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) attacks that can display high levels of uncertainty as events 
progress, demand ongoing timely reevaluation of response effectiveness, present a good 
likelihood of unexpected developments, and reflect an ongoing potential for catastrophic 
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outcomes.7,9,10,32 The resilience of communities and governments regarding bioterrorism 
acts requires the ability to adapt to and recover from adverse consequences within a 
reasonable timeframe. Communication is viewed as a crucial element of resilience because it 
can have a major influence on the timeliness of the public’s adoption of protective actions, 
readiness of leaders and government agencies to act decisively, adequacy of agencies’ 
preevent preparedness, selection of appropriate risk reduction strategies by leaders, and the 
willingness of affected populations to accept official declarations about the safety of 
environments as a result of decontamination and risk reduction efforts.6,15,22 “Resilience 
thinking” regarding terrorism or other extreme risk events33-35 emphasizes adapting in real 
time to ongoing or unexpected adverse events and having effective plans for maintaining 
public involvement in risk management as an incident evolves.6,18,36,37
Containment of social, psychological, physical, public health, and economic damage from 
significant acts of bioterrorism will depend in part on full engagement of large numbers of 
socially, economically, and culturally diverse populations who reside or work in geographic 
locations most likely to be targeted for particularly surprising and sizable terrorist acts.38-40 
Some frameworks frequently used to plan for risk/crisis communication, such as the 2002 
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) guidelines developed by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),41 have made valuable contributions to 
preparedness and communication strategies. However, despite updates, these remain limited 
in fully incorporating into strategic planning the implications of dynamic and uncertain 
aspects of a developing event that affects diverse populations.10,26 Paradigms that frame 
risk/ crisis communication as a dynamic process affected by multiple interacting factors (eg, 
“systems thinking”) may help identify additional priorities for risk/crisis communication 
planning and practice.
An especially useful but underused framework that predicts important demands of dynamic 
bioterrorism or other extreme public health emergencies is the notion of “situation 
awareness.” Endsley42 described high situation awareness as having 3 components: correct 
perceptions of critical information cues in the environment, comprehension of this 
information’s meaning, and anticipation of future situation dynamics and events. The term 
“situation awareness” has been used to describe a decision maker’s state of knowledge, but 
it also can refer to Endsley’s model,42 which depicts the factors that can interrupt, limit, or 
maximize situation awareness, given a decision-making scenario where relevant information 
is frequently changing, timeliness of actions or decisions is a major factor, and multiple 
sources provide feedback to risk managers about the current state of the environment (partly 
influenced by decision makers’ previous actions).42,43
This model emphasizes the temporal dynamics of an evolving event and highlights the 
importance of ongoing comprehension of what information is essential for decision making 
and actions and the timely integration of information about the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of previous or ongoing responses of decision makers. It represents the 
internal model of decision makers regarding the state of the environment or a dynamic 
event.42 Others recently have noted the model’s relevance to decision problems, policy-
making, and diagnosis of critical vulnerabilities in preparedness systems related to dynamic 
extreme or potentially catastrophic risk events.44,45 The situation awareness concept, as 
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applied to risk/crisis communication during an unfolding bioterrorism incident, suggests the 
types of messages that might be needed from risk communicators and leaders as events 
evolve and consequences of previous mitigation decisions and actions are realized. Optimal 
situation awareness aids in the identification and assessment of critical aspects of 
communication preparedness, including strengths and vulnerabilities of current popular 
approaches.
Gaps in Planning for Bioterrorism Risk Communication
Communicating Uncertainty During an Event
The situation awareness model does not require leaders and risk communicators to know 
everything during an ongoing event; rather, it emphasizes perception, comprehension, and 
prediction of crucial information and identification of what is missing or uncertain relative 
to what is needed to make effective decisions and achieve stated or implicit goals.42,46 
During a significant act of bioterrorism, some information released to the public will 
subsequently be altered, and this can increase public perceptions of communication 
uncertainty and inconsistency.6,9 The updated CERC framework22,46 and other recent 
models47 acknowledge the importance of addressing changing circumstances and 
uncertainty during an extreme risk event. However, characterizations of specific types of 
uncertainties and explanations for how these factors affect subsequent communication 
effectiveness and the public’s response as an event progresses have not been sufficiently 
explored, particularly in certain socioeconomic, cultural, and ethnic populations. Certain 
types of uncertainties are particularly threatening to public trust and the successful 
implementation of risk reduction plans.7,17,22,30,48-50 Failure to effectively communicate 
these uncertainties represents vulnerability in the preparedness and response system and can 
threaten the resilience of affected communities.51 From a situation awareness perspective, 
timely management and communication of uncertainty are essential. Although reducing 
uncertainty may not be possible, evidence suggests that some of its negative effects can be 
minimized with appropriate communication approaches.47,52
Adequate Responsiveness
Principles of situation awareness suggest that assessment and comprehension of persistent, 
emerging, or unexpected social disparities in communication effectiveness are key ongoing 
tasks as a crisis progresses.28,53 Significant acts of terrorism are most likely to occur in 
densely populated urban areas reflecting a range of cultural histories and backgrounds, 
ethnicities, primary languages, religions, access to resources, living situations, and 
socioeconomic circumstances.39,40 Each subpopulation brings different levels of trust, risk 
perceptions, reasoning strategies, and values to a terrorism incident or crisis situation.51,53,54 
Differences along these dimensions have important implications for dynamic risk 
communication because they may influence the ongoing interpretation or reinterpretation of 
crucial information during an evolving emergency, shape information needs, and affect 
response to recommended or mandatory self-protective guidance and the timeliness of 
personal actions.28,50,55,56 Vulnerability and potential for loss during acts of WMD 
terrorism or other extreme incidents may be elevated as an event progresses if risk 
communications do not resonate or are incompatible with expectations, life circumstances, 
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personal/community resources, values, information needs, and personal evaluation of risk 
circumstances.18,20,21,27,28 According to recent risk analyses,51 extreme events present an 
unequal potential for loss, not only because of preexisting vulnerabilities in terms of social, 
resource, and environmental factors,27,28,30,40 but also because of differences in trust and the 
potential influence of distrust of government or leaders.21,28,51,55,56 Although current 
models acknowledge and provide some guidance for communicating across diverse 
populations,26,28,57 persistent and recent social disparities in the effectiveness of strategic 
communications during a crisis or emergency, as illustrated during Hurricane Katrina or the 
2009-10 H1N1 pandemic, suggest the need for greater understanding of why sociocultural 
diversity is related to and affects the effectiveness of communication.
Consequence Management Phase
Until recently, significant resources and plans for strategic risk/crisis communication often 
concentrated on initial response or maintenance stages of a terrorist attack and placed less 
emphasis on the formidable communication needs and challenges likely to emerge during 
consequence management.7,50 As a bioterrorism event progresses, leaders and government 
agencies can expect numerous scientific uncertainties, technical challenges for 
decontamination, possible disagreements among scientific experts, persistent doubts about 
safety among the public, and intense scrutiny of decisions about “how clean is clean 
enough” during decontamination and clearance of environments.7,50,58,59 Furthermore, 
uncertainty and the public’s communication needs will be affected by whether dispersed 
biological agents have been weaponized, altered in other ways, or delivered through 
unexpected or novel means.7,58,59 These circumstances predict inevitable communication 
errors and missteps when the demand for timely information is intense and preliminary 
assessments of the situation are communicated by necessity.7,50,59 A resilient and effective 
risk communication strategy and infrastructure would successfully adapt to anticipated and 
unexpected events and to the critical evolving information needs of all affected populations 
during recovery and remediation stages of a biocontamination event.
This Study
This survey and interview study of bioterrorism risk perceptions and communications 
addressed 3 gaps in the current scientific literature and in practice regarding crisis and 
uncertainty communication. The research explored possible public responses to a set of 
messages and concepts that would need to be conveyed to diverse at-risk urban populations 
during an uncertain and changing episode of biological terrorism that had contaminated 
public spaces. We hypothesized that reported reactions to official communications about 
consequence management would be related to certain preexisting cognitive, cultural, and 
other psychosocial characteristics of individuals that have been strongly associated in 
previous research with risk perceptions and response to crisis communications.31,60-63 We 
expected that these factors would account for more of the variability in reactions to 
communications than individuals’ sociodemographic profile, and the study distinguished 
between sociodemographic variables and factors that describe the psychosocial context of 
risk decision making. A growing body of evidence about social variability in the success of 
communication efforts and risk decisions of the public suggests that sociodemographic 
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characteristics may be proxies for underlying psychosocial, experiential, and cultural 
processes that comprise a person’s perspectives on and reasoning about risk and 
uncertainty.11,17,22,63 By focusing only on sociodemographic features to profile or segment 
populations, studies may not adequately inform policies about reasons for variability in 
information needs or how to correct the differential impact of certain crisis and risk 
communication strategies across diverse ethnic and socioeconomic populations.
This study examined risk perceptions and beliefs about biological terrorism among residents 
in 2 ethnically and culturally diverse geographic areas that had been assessed as high threat, 
high vulnerability for potential acts of terrorism or extreme risk events: New York City 
(mainly King’s County, Brooklyn) and Santa Ana (in Orange County), California. The 
research used a situation awareness paradigm to identify critical risk messages during the 
consequence management phase and assessed participants’ reactions to and interpretation of 
reassurances and messages that conveyed uncertainties in recovery activities. The 
communications presented during the study had been issued by government officials during 
a previous episode of biological terrorism or another public health emergency in the U.S. 
Although the data were collected several years ago, the questions and variable relationships 
examined by this research are relevant to existing and continuing gaps in the scientific 
literature, practice, and preparedness regarding bioterrorism risk management in diverse 
urban populations. In addition, the distributions of participants on several of the measured 
psychosocial variables were consistent with findings from recent studies of the risk 
perspectives and responses of diverse urban populations.17,20,21,54 Finally, the gaps in risk/
crisis communication effectiveness that were explored in this study were once again evident 
during more recent significant public health incidents, including the 2009-10 H1N1 
influenza pandemic and Hurricane Katrina.18,20-24 Thus, the study’s emphasis remains 
relevant to current efforts to improve and update crisis communication preparedness for and 
response to bioterrorism threats in complex urban areas and provides new data on these 
topics.
Methods
Widmeyer Communications conducted the survey in October 2004 for collaborators at the 
University of California, Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health, and the 
CDC. Researchers selected 2 urban locations previously identified as high-threat, high-
density areas and that also were assessed as high priority in regard to social vulnerability (ie, 
loss potential) to natural or human-caused hazardous events, including acts of terrorism.64,65 
New York City and Santa Ana were selected as target sampling areas. Telephone area codes 
and exchanges in a specific geographic area were identified, and a simple random sampling 
scheme that followed a random digit dialing procedure was used to construct a sample of 
170 African Americans who resided in New York City and a sample of 150 Hispanics/
Latinos from Orange County, California (primarily from the city of Santa Ana, where 80% 
of residents are of Hispanic/Latino background66,67). An initial open-ended screening 
question asked potential participants what group best represented their race or ethnicity, and 
the response to this question determined whether the interviewer proceeded after receiving 
the respondent’s verbal consent. Each interview lasted approximately 22 minutes. The 
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Institutional Review Boards at the University of California, Irvine, and Columbia University 
approved the study.
Survey Instrument and Constructed Measures
The survey and interview questionnaire included subscales and measures totaling 79 items 
that focused on bioterrorism risk perceptions, trust in government to respond effectively and 
fairly to terrorism events, beliefs and reasoning strategies regarding bioterrorism and other 
public health threats, and responses to uncertainties and reassurances in official bioterrorism 
communications. The quantitative instrument was informed by previous scientific studies 
and results from focus groups that Widmeyer Communications conducted during May 2004 
with African American and Hispanic residents of Philadelphia on the topics of bioterrorism 
risks, trust, and public health emergency preparedness. Before presenting risk perception 
items and the primary scales in the survey instrument, the interviewer defined “bioterrorism” 
as the deliberate use of biological agents such as anthrax, smallpox, or other germs and 
viruses to harm civilians or communities. Following the interview, several items elicited 
sociodemographic information (Table 1).
Participants were presented with a list of public health threats and asked how concerned they 
were about each. Responses were recorded on a quantitative scale, ranging from “not at all 
concerned” to “extremely concerned.” Public health threats included bioterrorism, chemical 
terrorism, radiological terrorism, natural disasters, outbreaks of infectious diseases such as 
West Nile virus or SARS, contamination of the water supply, and release of anything toxic 
that would harm air quality. Three additional quantitative items assessed general perceptions 
of the personal threat from terrorism, and responses were averaged to produce an index. 
Higher numbers represented greater perceptions of personal risk. The scale demonstrated 
acceptable internal consistency or reliability for the African American sample (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .724) and the Hispanic/Latino sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .756).
Two items measured the perceived fairness of government officials when managing a 
bioterrorism incident: (1) “Do you think that public officials will treat lower income people 
the same as, better than, or worse than others during a terrorist event or public health 
emergency?” and (2) “Do you think that public officials will treat communities that are 
African American or Hispanic the same as, worse than, or better than others during a 
terrorist event or public health emergency?” Values on these variables were strongly 
associated (Chi-square (1) = 20.306, p < .001) and were added to produce a single composite 
variable. Two additional quantitative items assessed trust in government officials to release 
timely, honest, and accurate risk information during a terrorism event or health emergency, 
and 1 item asked about participants’ belief that government and public health officials are 
prepared to deal with a terrorist event in their neighborhood.
Two subscales were constructed to measure typical reasoning or information processing 
strategies about bioterrorism communications. Original items and questions from previous 
studies that had measured analytical and heuristic information processing styles were 
included.62,68 For the analytical processing style, 6 questions measured the extent to which 
consideration of terrorism information tends to be deliberative, effortful, attentive to details, 
and responsive to argument quality. Responses were averaged to produce an index that was 
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highly reliable for the African American sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .815) and the 
Hispanic/Latino sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .830). Higher values on the scale reflected less 
agreement with statements representative of an analytical information processing style. A 
second subscale measured a heuristic information processing strategy regarding bioterrorism 
communications, and 5 statements were presented that reflected the extent to which 
consideration of bioterrorism information usually relied on simpler decision rules and were 
intuitive, experiential, or based primarily on affect/ emotion. These items produced a 
subscale that was reliable for African American (Cronbach’s alpha = .724) and Hispanic/
Latino (Cronbach’s alpha = .699) participants. Higher values on this scale reflected less 
agreement with statements representative of a heuristic information processing style.
We also measured participants’ responses to 2 types of frequent risk/crisis communication 
statements: those that offered general reassurances and those that acknowledged 
uncertainties. The LexisNexis® Academic database of TV and radio news broadcasts was 
used to identify exact statements that previously had been made by leaders and risk 
communicators, and these were sampled for this study. Respondents were first asked to 
indicate how worried or reassured they felt after hearing each of 6 messages of reassurance. 
Values were averaged to produce an index of the degree of reassurance felt by respondents. 
The scale demonstrated high reliability for the African American sample (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .841) and for the Hispanic/Latino sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .802).
Five additional statements that had appeared in the broadcast media during the anthrax 
incidents of 2001 were presented. The statements addressed uncertainties in risk estimates 
and mitigation strategies to decontaminate, clear, or reopen contaminated facilities. 
Respondents expressed whether they felt more reassured or more fearful as a result of the 
message. Responses were averaged, and this scale demonstrated acceptable reliability for the 
African American sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .819) and the Hispanic/ Latino sample 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .734).
Data Analysis
Data from completed questionnaires were entered into an Excel file, checked for accuracy, 
and then converted and imported into a data file for analysis using the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) 14.0. Final analyses used SPSS Version 18.0. Responses with 
missing values on any of the variables were excluded. Statistical procedures used 
unweighted data to perform analyses. Cross-tabulations examined frequency distributions on 
the socio-demographic variables by race/ethnicity, and differences between the 2 samples 
were tested using Chi-square statistics. Group differences on measures of risk perceptions, 
information processing styles, and responses to risk communication reassurances and 
uncertainty messages were examined using t-tests. Group differences on the composite 
fairness variable and the 2 trust questions were tested using Chi-square statistics.
A linear multiple regression procedure examined factors that might explain why general 
statements of reassurance were effective for some individuals, but not others. A second 
regression procedure considered possible predictors of reactions to uncertainty 
communications. Because preliminary analyses revealed that the data did not violate the 
statistical assumptions of ordinary linear regression models, a linear multiple regression 
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procedure entered a set of predictors in a series of 3 sequential steps, and a final model, 
including all specified possible predictors, was tested.
Step 1 represented sociodemographic variables as predictors of individual responses to 
general reassurance statements or communications about risk and safety uncertainties. 
Sociodemographic variables entered into the regression equation were age, income, whether 
the respondent had children younger than 18 years of age, gender, level of education, and 
race/ethnicity.
Step 2 added to the prediction equation psychological variables previously associated with 
the interpretation of and response to risk communications while controlling for 
sociodemographic factors. Variables included preexisting risk perceptions about personal 
threat from terrorism; analytical information processing style for bioterrorism 
communications; heuristic information processing style; perceived fairness of government 
authorities when managing terrorism events; and trust in officials’ openness, accuracy, and 
honesty about disclosing negative information during a terrorism event.
Step 3 entered interaction terms into the regression equation that represented whether effects 
of these psychological variables on response to reassurances or uncertainty messages 
depended on the population from which a respondent had been sampled. The sequential 
regression analysis procedure uses an F-statistic to test whether adding a set of variables to 
the prediction equation at a particular step adds significantly to the explanatory power of the 
model while controlling for factors already included in the equation. A t-statistic tested for 
the significance of each independent variable within a set at each step of the procedure.
Results
A total of 320 participants from New York and California completed the survey and 
interview questionnaire. Sociodemographic characteristics of the African American and 
Hispanic/Latino samples are presented in Table 1. The 2 groups did not differ significantly 
in gender composition, annual income, or percentage of participants having children under 
the age of 18. However, individuals in the Hispanic/Latino sample tended to be younger, had 
less formal education, were more likely to be employed part-time as opposed to full-time or 
to be unemployed, and were less likely to be divorced or widowed.
Risk Perceptions
The mean values on scales measuring concern about particular public health emergency 
situations showed that respondents tended to be “somewhat concerned” about the listed 
public health emergencies. Across the 2 samples, ratings of concern for the bioterrorism 
threat were higher than the average ratings for other public health emergencies and terrorism 
events (F(1,307) = 14.98, p < .001), but these differences were only statistically significant 
for relatively lower levels of concern about natural disasters and contamination of water 
supplies. Both samples were similar in average concern for the various public health 
emergencies and terrorism events, including bioterrorism (F(1,307) = .188, ns).
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In general, participants perceived some personal risk from the terrorism threat. The 2 
samples differed in their assessments: African Americans living in New York perceived a 
greater personal risk from terrorism than did Hispanics/Latinos in California (t (317) = − 
2.69, p < .01). Across all participants, the majority—68%—were somewhat or very 
confident that during a terrorism event or public health emergency, government officials 
would provide accurate and timely information in their community, but this percentage 
varied by ethnicity/race (Chi-square (3) = 29.82, p < .001): 83% of Hispanic/Latino 
participants expressed this level of confidence versus only 55% of African Americans.
In contrast, only 18% of all survey participants believed that officials would be mostly or 
completely forthcoming and honest about negative information during a terrorism event, and 
differences between the 2 samples were not statistically significant. Moreover, participants 
expressed considerable skepticism about how fair officials would be to individuals from 
lower income and/or African American and Hispanic communities during a terrorism event 
or public health emergency. Across all participants, 46% believed that officials would treat 
them worse than others, but differences between the 2 samples on this question were highly 
significant. Of Hispanic/Latino respondents, 32% believed that lower income individuals 
would be treated worse than others, versus 58% of African Americans (Chi-square (2) = 
23.59, p < .001). When considering the treatment of African Americans and Hispanics/
Latinos by officials during a terrorist attack, 41% of survey participants thought these 
communities would be treated worse than others. Of African American respondents, 45% 
believed this to be true, versus 36% of Hispanics/Latinos (Chi-square (2) = 8.11, p < .05). In 
addition, more African American participants (50%) than Hispanics/Latinos (41%) believed 
that public officials would not be prepared to deal with a terrorist event in their 
neighborhood (Chi-square (3) = 7.84, p < .05).
Despite these group differences, the samples did not differ in average responses to general 
reassurances or uncertainty messages previously issued by government officials during an 
extreme risk event. In addition, when encountering new communications about biological 
terrorism, many individuals reported using multiple information processing or reasoning 
styles. Both samples were similar in the likelihood of using an analytical information 
processing strategy to consider new information. However, Hispanics/ Latinos were more 
likely than African Americans to also use a heuristic processing strategy to reason about 
bioterrorism threat information (t(317) = − 3.20, p < .005).
Multivariate Analysis
Table 2 summarizes results of the linear regression procedure that examined predictors of 
responses to general reassurances issued by public officials during a past bioterrorism event 
or public health emergency. On Step 1, sociodemographic variables, including race or 
ethnicity, did not predict how reassured individuals were by official communications that 
offered general encouragement and optimism about managing a terrorism incident (F(6,220) 
= 1.50, ns). However, 3 of the psychological variables were significant predictors of 
respondents’ reactions (F(12,214) = 3.97, p < .001). Individuals reported being more 
reassured and less worried in response to encouraging messages from government officials 
if they were more likely to use an analytic information processing style (t(214) = − 4.10, p 
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< .001), had lower general risk perceptions about personal threat from terrorism (t(214) = − 
3.13, p < .005), and were more confident that public officials would provide timely and 
accurate information about a terrorism event in their community (t(214) = 2.43, p < .05). In 
the final model, 2 of the sociodemographic variables did reach statistical significance, 
although to a lesser degree than the psychological variables. When considering all possible 
predictors in the final step of the regression procedure, gender and education level predicted 
reassurance in response to leaders’ encouraging messages, with men and those with more 
formal education more likely to report being reassured.
The second regression procedure identified several significant predictors of participants’ 
responses to uncertainty messages from leaders that appeared in the media during the 
cleanup and restoration phases of the 2001 anthrax incident. These findings are summarized 
in Table 3. Sociodemographic variables, including ethnicity, were not significant predictors 
of the level of reassurance or fear that participants reported after listening to messages about 
uncertainties regarding cleanup, restoration, and recovery after a bioterrorism incident. Step 
2 of the regression procedure revealed that 3 psychological variables were significant 
predictors (F(12,235) = 3.33, p < .001). Participants were more likely to report feeling 
fearful about uncertainty communications if they believed officials would be unfair in 
dealing with lower income and minority communities during a public health emergency or 
act of terrorism (t(223) = 3.26, p < .005) and had greater risk perceptions about personal 
threat from terrorism (t(223) = − 3.16, p < .005). If participants believed that officials would 
be honest and forthcoming with negative information, they tended to feel less reassured (ie, 
more fearful) by the acknowledgment of risk uncertainties, and this variable approached the 
level of statistical significance (t(223) = − 1.83, p < .10). However, in Step 3 of the 
regression procedure (Table 3), significant interactions between sample population and 
psychological predictors of response to uncertainty messages clarified these relationships.
General risk perceptions about personal threat presented by terrorism did not affect how 
African Americans responded to uncertainty communications (t(169) = −.01, ns), but for 
Hispanics/Latinos in the study, greater perceptions of personal risk tended to be associated 
with more reported fear and less reassurance in response to uncertainty messages (t(150) = 
− .285, p < .01). Furthermore, the level of trust in government officials to provide accurate 
and timely information in their community had a different effect on responses to risk 
uncertainties for the 2 samples (t(217) = −2.26, p < .05). For African Americans, greater 
confidence that officials would provide accurate and timely information was associated with 
a greater likelihood of feeling reassured when government officials’ messages openly 
referred to risk uncertainties (Pearson r (163) =.172, p < .05). In contrast, among Hispanics/
Latinos, more confidence that risk information would be accurate and timely was associated 
with more reported fear when risk messages acknowledged uncertainties (Pearson r (142) = 
−.207, p < .01).
Discussion
In the aftermath of the 2001 anthrax bioterrorism event, 2 crucial challenges during the 
remediation and recovery periods became apparent. First, the science is still evolving 
regarding cleanup, restoration, and clearance of environments after a biocontamination 
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event; therefore, some safety and consequence management decisions will be made with 
incomplete, evolving, or imperfect knowledge.7,22,58,59 Second, uncertainties and risk 
communication gaps can have vastly different impacts on individuals from different 
sociocultural backgrounds, risk perspectives, and life circumstances.7,9,11,17,22 Effective risk 
and uncertainty communications during decontamination and recovery phases of a 
biological attack will play a crucial role in the mitigation of damage and timely 
recovery.69-72 This study explored several challenges for the risk/crisis communication 
process during consequence management in 2 urban populations especially vulnerable to 
loss in the event of an extreme act of biological terrorism. Results from this preliminary 
research suggest possible explanations for why particular uncertainty communications and 
messages of reassurance from leaders might be effective for some individuals and not 
others, and how communication strategies might address these challenges.
Responses to Uncertainty Communication
Findings from this study demonstrated significant variability in responses to official 
communications within 2 groups that typically are assigned to different segments of 
audiences for targeted communication strategies.72 Heterogeneity within certain ethnic or 
racial groups in risk perceptions, behavioral intentions, trust, and risk/crisis communication 
needs during a public health emergency is often minimized in preparedness strategies and 
plans.24,54 In this study, participants were somewhat divided in their reactions to 
communications about uncertainties in consequence management that had been previously 
issued by leaders during an extreme public health emergency. Whether individuals reported 
feeling reassured or fearful after hearing bioterrorism messages about uncertainties in 
decontamination efforts or reoccupancy decisions depended on preexisting trust in 
government officials to fairly and competently manage the consequences of a terrorist act, 
and on prior risk perceptions about the terrorism threat in general. These variables were 
more predictive of response to uncertainty messages than any sociodemographic variable.
The technical details or content of communications about uncertainties in risk management 
during the restoration and recovery stages of a biocontamination event will not be the sole 
determinants of how at-risk populations will evaluate and respond to official messages. 
Instead, protected values,73 such as perceived fairness of officials who respond to a public 
health threat, and preexisting risk beliefs also are likely to play a significant role. These 
findings are compatible with previous research that has shown fairness beliefs and trust to be 
especially important to individual decision making and interpretation of events under 
conditions of uncertainty.74,75
The significant association between values or preexisting risk beliefs and reactions to 
uncertainty messages in this research is noteworthy given that the 2 samples reflected 
different cultural and ethnic backgrounds, social histories, and geographic locations. 
Moreover, participants responded to actual past messages from leaders and public health 
officials that had been constructed based on in-place risk/crisis communication plans 
thought to reflect best practices at the time of the 2001 anthrax episode.76 Of course, 
response to official communications may differ if these messages are conveyed in the 
context of an actual ongoing event.
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Results also suggest that although the same values and prior beliefs can influence responses 
to uncertainty communications across diverse communities, the direction of these effects 
may differ depending on other population characteristics. For example, preexisting trust or 
confidence in leaders to provide accurate information was associated with different reactions 
to uncertainty communications for African American and Hispanic/Latino participants, and 
preexisting perceptions about personal risk from terrorism only influenced the response to 
uncertainty messages in the Hispanic/Latino sample. These interactions may reflect group 
differences in cultural perspectives on risk, social experiences, and other psychosocial 
characteristics that guide individuals’ interpretation and perceived importance of events. 
These factors sensitize individuals to particular aspects of judgment situations while 
affecting the persuasiveness of certain information.51,53,60 In this study, Hispanic/Latino 
participants when compared to African American individuals tended to use a heuristic 
information processing style, and this could be associated with an increased reliance on 
preexisting perceptions of the terrorism threat to interpret the meaning of new uncertainty 
communications.
Moreover, consistent with previous studies,54,63 these samples differed significantly in 
perceptions of the fairness of government officials, beliefs about the likely honesty and 
competence of leaders during a public health emergency, and the preparedness of 
government officials to respond to a terrorist event in their neighborhood. Differences in 
each community’s past experiences and history with public health or medical care systems 
and other government agencies also may contribute to differences in the likelihood of 
responding to risk communications in particular ways.17,28,54,63 This suggests that the 
“baseline” psychosocial context of decision making about and response to new uncertainty 
and risk messages may differ between groups from varied cultural and experiential 
backgrounds.24
Improved communication strategies must take into account where individuals start as a 
reference point for reasoning about and interpreting risk information and recognize that 
individuals bring a preexisting readiness to interpret messages in particular ways 
independent of specific facts. This reference point is crucial for decision making and actions 
under conditions of uncertainty, because depending on this starting point, events can take on 
a different personal significance, meaning, and utility for decision making.77 Furthermore, 
certain communication errors or missteps can have a lingering or persistent negative effect 
for some individuals if “baseline” perspectives lead to an emphasis on the significance 
and/or a moral interpretation of particular communication missteps (eg, attributions of 
unfairness or injustice) and influence whether these missteps are perceived to confirm 
preexisting hypotheses about leaders.11,17,18,22,55 This was demonstrated during the H1N1 
pandemic in 2009-10 where, for some “low trust” communities, the level of distrust actually 
increased as the pandemic progressed and some communication and risk management 
missteps occurred, including the unanticipated delay in the availability of the H1N1 vaccine 
in early fall 2009.14,20,21 Preexisting beliefs and values create expectations for uncertainty 
communications and government actions, and during a prolonged incident, a violation of or 
failure to acknowledge these may impede communication effectiveness.21,23
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Although many of the “group differences” findings from this study are consistent with 
previous research on ethnic and cultural differences in risk perceptions, crisis 
communication effects, and fairness beliefs,54 the fact that the samples were drawn from 
populations in different geographic locations complicates interpretations of group 
comparisons. For example, differences between the groups in previous engagement with or 
outreach efforts by government public health, social services, or homeland security agencies 
could contribute to differences in receptivity to the messages presented in the study, 
although in this investigation, on the average, reaction to the uncertainty and reassurance 
messages did not differ between the groups. The design of this survey study did not allow 
for a clear separation of the effects of place from ethnicity on responses to risk 
communications. Furthermore, the African American participants resided in close proximity 
to the World Trade Center site targeted by terrorists on September 11, 2001 (based on zip 
codes, the median residential distance of participants from the attack site was 5 miles), 
whereas the Hispanic/Latino participants were all California residents. The experience of 
living near the targeted sites could have influenced risk perceptions and response to 
uncertainty communications of African American survey participants, although the intensity 
and psychological characteristics of response to an extreme terrorism event is not always 
predicted by proximity to the physical damage from or site of terrorist attacks.78 Other 
psychosocial and cultural processes may have contributed to group differences rather than 
just geography, and this possibility should be pursued in future research.
Effects of General Reassurances
During an extreme or a catastrophic risk event where casualties, uncertainty, and significant 
damage are apparent, affected populations will look to leaders (and other sources) for 
credible, honest, and timely information about the nature of the crisis or public health 
emergency, guidance about what personal actions should be taken to remain safe, 
predictions about what to expect in the near future, and transparency in decision 
making.79,80 Communities seek reassurance that reasonable actions are being taken to 
reduce risk and uncertainty and that the best interests of their families and communities have 
top priority.80
In this study, when presented with messages of reassurance and comfort that had been issued 
by leaders during a past public health emergency, some participants reported more worry 
and less reassurance. The likelihood that statements of encouragement and optimism from 
officials prompted less reassurance and more worry was predicted by 3 factors: a decreased 
likelihood to adopt an analytical information processing style when considering bioterrorism 
communications, greater preexisting perceptions of personal risk from the terrorism threat, 
and less confidence that information will be accurate and timely. Leaders often assume a 
shared interpretation of risk messages between communicators and audiences,22 but this 
clearly is not always the case. As Clarke et al.22 have discussed, “… different audiences may 
need different messages or different kinds of messages,” and “… different groups may hear 
different things from the same words.” The communication process is more likely to 
succeed if leaders and risk communicators have figured out how to have different groups 
hear what is intended, but also if the process facilitates how well leaders hear and act on the 
information needs, concerns, and priorities of affected populations during an extreme risk 
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event.22,75,80 It may be more productive to think beyond typical sociodemographic profiles 
of populations most vulnerable to communication failures during a mass contamination 
event and consider the context or psychosocial environment of risk in terms of high or low 
trust individuals and in reference to likely preexisting values and risk perceptions.81,82
Building an Updated Risk Communication Response Plan
The findings of this study have several implications for policymakers, practitioners, and risk 
communicators who are working to improve risk communication planning and 
implementation during response to a dynamic bioterrorism incident. The first implication 
relates to the importance of particular psychosocial factors in how people interpret and 
respond to uncertainty and reassurance messages, not only during the initial stages of an 
emerging event, but also during subsequent decontamination and recovery phases. The 
psychosocial environment can influence baseline perspectives of individuals when 
knowledge of an event first occurs, but also can contribute to changes in the public’s 
reactions and growing disparities in communication effectiveness as uncertainties emerge 
and specific government actions are taken to contain the incident.
Therefore, in addition to assessing baseline perspectives of various audiences during the 
preevent period, agencies and risk communicators should consider the need and how to 
update those assessments on a periodic basis during the course of the crisis response and 
remediation stages. In particular, it may be essential to perform ongoing assessments of risk 
communication effectiveness and gaps in meeting the information needs of vulnerable social 
groups or communities whose response patterns might differ from those of the general 
population. Assessments should be specific and informed by the best and most up-to-date 
scientific evidence regarding what is likely to be most relevant to judgments and decision 
making for diverse affected populations. For example, a general question about current 
public trust in leaders and government agencies will not be as helpful to improve or modify 
communications as evaluations of specific components of trust such as confidence in 
officials’ openness and honesty, competence, and expertise in providing accurate and timely 
information, and fairness in protecting all individuals regardless of social status or ethnic/
cultural background.83
As we found in this study, particular groups may focus on different aspects of trust when 
compared to others, and to address the information needs of a particular community, those 
elements of trust that are essential must be reflected in communication processes and 
content. Crisis communicators should consider the need for brief, iterative rounds of process 
and outcome evaluation of the contents and impact of warnings and messages in different 
segments of the population. The goals of periodic, short-term process and outcome 
evaluation of risk communication activities would be to modify strategies, audience 
segmentation, and message content to meet any emerging information needs during an 
evolving incident and to assess the ongoing psychosocial environment of public health and 
homeland security decision making. If feasible and timely, established assessment 
techniques such as focus group discussions, opinion polling, public meetings and internet 
surveys might be useful in detecting significant changes in audience perspectives and 
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information needs. These techniques already have been applied on occasion with some 
success for adapting risk management strategies in real time.84
Preevent agreements between government agencies and academic, private, or other 
nongovernment entities can greatly facilitate the timely assessment of public reactions 
should a significant incident occur.85 In addition, newer assessment techniques related to 
systematic monitoring and analysis of social media offer critical tools to identify ongoing 
and emerging information needs and risk perceptions of various affected populations. These 
techniques facilitate the accurate, timely, and up-to-date situation awareness of emergency 
management organizations and government agencies.86
A second implication of this study relates to the reluctance of some segments of the U.S. 
population to accept or respond to government agencies’ or leaders’ warnings, self-
protection directives, and risk and recovery messages. As others have suggested,28 to 
address patterns of nonresponse and mistrust in disaffected segments of the population, risk 
communicators should build on positive relationships of mutual trust with opinion leaders 
and trusted sources of information in those communities during normal conditions prior to a 
significant incident. During the evolution of the crisis, then, essential tasks are early 
outreach and meaningful engagement with these trusted partners whose involvement might 
signal to their community that the warnings and messages are informed by their needs, 
perspectives, and particular sensitivities. However, even if considerable efforts have been 
made to strengthen government-community relations in the preevent phase, new critical 
communication needs and mistrust can emerge over the course of an unfolding bioterrorism 
event as risk circumstances dramatically change and some missteps or errors in 
communication or risk management inevitably surface because an event’s threat details 
cannot be completely predicted in advance.7,22,26,87,88
This situation requires procedures in place to support comprehensive ongoing monitoring of 
public responses, including the responses of those subpopulations in economically and 
culturally diverse urban areas who may be at risk and whose life circumstances may present 
different challenges for response and recovery. Furthermore, an agency’s communication 
infrastructure should include “built-in” flexibility in emergency or crisis management 
strategies. Communicators and risk managers need to be prepared to respond to evolving 
and unforeseen uncertainty in situational circumstances, unexpected missteps in crisis/ risk 
communication, “surprising” events or a possible loss of trust in leaders that may not have 
been anticipated during planning. In these circumstances, it is especially crucial for risk and 
uncertainty communications to acknowledge previous significant errors (with explanations 
for how the errors are being addressed) and the prioritized or “protected” values of affected 
populations (eg, clear, concise, and reasonable explanations for any differential treatment of 
subgroups that could be interpreted as biased or unfair).
Communicators also need to explain how decision making by leaders is being informed by 
the information needs and perspectives of affected populations.83 Even though having a 
diversity of messengers from government agencies and communities is likely to improve the 
quality of risk/crisis communication strategies, this will be insufficient for effective 
engagement of certain communities unless the actual content of messages is compatible with 
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what is valued and needed by a community for decision making. Best practices in crisis and 
risk communication under conditions of low trust, high emotions, uncertainty, time urgency, 
and potential for significant casualties may differ somewhat from practices that are effective 
in the absence of these factors.83
Importantly, some of the actions described above might require changes in public health 
preparedness policies and regulations at the federal, state, and local levels. Such policies 
regulate the process of collecting information from the public (paperwork reduction act), 
human research protection, rules for the sharing of information between and among 
government jurisdictions, and the development, implementation, and evaluation of risk 
communication campaigns. Government agencies at all levels that are likely to be involved 
in managing the consequences of a significant bioterrorism incident may benefit from a 
thorough preevent evaluation of any existing regulatory and organizational barriers to 
flexible and dynamic risk and crisis communication approaches that could be used rapidly, if 
needed, during an evolving event.
Conclusion
By far the most likely scenario for an act of WMD terrorism is an attack carried out in a 
complex, densely populated city or urban center, placing at risk communities that reflect a 
range of socioeconomic or life circumstances, orientations toward risk, and ethnic or cultural 
backgrounds.38-40 As a significant act unfolds, some ongoing uncertainties would have been 
predicted; others will become apparent only as the event develops.6-9,58,59,70,87 Distrust of 
government actions and decisions will be high in some communities, moderate in 
others,11,17,23,28,75 and preexisting social and environmental vulnerabilities to extreme 
events will contribute to an unequal potential for loss.6,50,89
During this dynamic phase, skilled communications about decontamination strategies, 
protection of public health, cleanup, restoration, and reoccupancy will be essential to support 
efforts to protect public health and maintain/restore public confidence within a context of 
disturbing events. Agencies and organizations need sufficient structure and preparedness, 
but also adaptive capacity, to respond to changing circumstances and an honest ongoing 
assessment of communication effectiveness and any gaps across diverse affected 
populations.
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Black/African American New York, NY (N = 
170) (%) Hispanic/Latino Santa Ana, CA (N = 150) (%)
Age (years)***
 18-24 14 31
 25-29 14 25
 30-34 9 14
 35-39 13 11
 40-44 15 8
 45-49 9 4
 50-54 7 2
 55-59 7 3
 60-64 4 1
 65-75 6 1
 75 + 3 1
Gender (female) 49 53
Education (highest level completed)*
 Grade school 4 9
 Some high school 13 14
 High school graduate 27 32
 Some college 31 32
 Undergraduate degree 16 11
 Graduate or professional degree 7 1
Employment status**
 Full time 47 37
 Part time 17 33
 Currently unemployed 35 29
Marital status*
 Married 33 36
 Single 46 55
 Widowed 7 1
 Separated 5 3
 Divorced 10 5
Annual household income
 Less than $20,000 26 24
 $20,000-$29,000 28 32
 $30,000-$39,000 14 14
 $40,000-$49,000 8 10
 $50,000-$59,000 8 5
 $60,000-$69,000 5 3
 $70,000-$79,000 6 6
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Variable
Black/African American New York, NY (N = 
170) (%) Hispanic/Latino Santa Ana, CA (N = 150) (%)
 $80,000 + 5 6
Children under 18 (yes) 35 40
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Table 2
Multiple Linear Regression Predicting Reassurance from Government Officials’ Messages of Optimism and 
Encouragement about a Bioterrorism Incident (N = 320)
Step and Predictor Change in R2
Standardized βs
Step1 Step 2 Step 3
Step 1: Sociodemographic Model .04
 Significant predictors:
 Education .13 .14* .14*
 Gender1 –.12 –.14* –.14*
 Nonsignificant predictors:
 Race/ethnicity2 .13 .04 .05
 Household income –.06 –.05 –.03
 Age –.04 –.07 –.07
 Children under 18 .03 –.04 –.04
Step 2: Psychosocial Model .14****
 Significant predictors:
 Analytical info processing style — –.28**** –.28**
 Terrorism risk perceptions — –.20*** –.20*
 Trust in info accuracy/timeliness — .17* .21*
 Nonsignificant predictors:
 Perceived fairness — .07 .11
 Heuristic info processing style — .06 .07
 Trust in officials’ honesty about negative terrorism info — .09 .05
Step 3: Interactions:
Ethnic/cultural background by psychosocial predictors .01
 Nonsignificant predictors:
 Ethnic × fairness — — –.07
 Ethnic × risk perception — — .02
 Ethnic × analytic style — — .01
 Ethnic × heuristic style — — –.02
 Ethnic × trust info accuracy — — .08









Note. Model summary at final step: F(18, 226) = 2.69, p < .001, R2 = .19 (adjusted R2 = .12).
1
Male coded as “1,” female coded as “2.”
2
Hispanic/Latino coded as “1,” African American coded as “0.”
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Table 3
Multiple Linear Regression Predicting Level of Reassurance or Fear in Response to Bioterrorism 
Communications about Uncertainty (N = 320)
Step and Predictor Change in R2
Standardized βs
Step1 Step 2 Step 3
Step 1: Sociodemographic Model .05
 Nonsignificant predictors:
 Education –.12 –.13 –.01
 Race/ethnicity1 .09 .07 .06
 Children under 18 .07 .02 .03
 Age –.06 –.10 –.09
 Gender2 –.06 –.10 –.09
 Household Income –.02 –.01 –.01
Step 2: Psychosocial Model .10****
 Significant predictors:
 Perceived fairness — .23*** .24**
 Terrorism risk perceptions — –.20*** –.20***
 Nonsignificant predictors:
 Trust in officials’ honesty about negative terrorism info — –.12 .02
 Heuristic info processing style — .09 .08
 Analytical info processing style — –.06 –.06
 Trust in info accuracy/timeliness — –.05 .09
Step 3: Interaction:
Ethnic/cultural background by psychosocial predictors .06**
 Significant predictors:
 Ethnic × risk perception — — –.21**
 Ethnic × trust info accuracy — — –.19*
 Nonsignificant predictors:
 Ethnic × trust officials’ honesty — — –.14
 Ethnic × analytic style — — –.10
 Ethnic × heuristic style — — .02









Note. Model summary at final step: F(18, 235) = 3.22, p < .001, R2 = .21 (adjusted R2 = .15).
1
Hispanic/Latino coded as “1,” African American coded as “0.”
2
Male coded as “1,” female coded as “2.”
Biosecur Bioterror. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 October 10.
